



Measuring Discrepancies in Attack Surfaces Generated By Internet Intelligence Platforms

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
Nicholas Race, Paul Smith

Background

- In 2024, half of all UK businesses faced a disruptive cyber attack, even more recent with M&S
- Organisations and Policymakers are searching for solutions
- To understand the risk faced, the attack surface of an organisation must be known
- Motivated by previous work with the NCSC who wanted to understand an attack surface and vulnerabilities at a sector-wide scale.


The External Attack Surface

- “Assets or services that are publicly reachable online” – NCSC [1]
- We quantify this as the IP addresses of the assets or services, such as a webpage host.
- Theoretically, it is easy to discover the surface, just ask the Regional Internet Registry
- All your services run on your assigned addresses, inside your ‘castle’



The External Attack Surface

- Cloud Computing and Third-Party hosting has made it difficult to map
- Services are being hosted externally
- Crucial services are no longer within your managed network, moved outside your 'castle'
- Manually discovering this surface is problematic, there is no ground-truth
- EASM tools attempt to mitigate this



Internet Intelligence Platforms

- Also known as Internet Search Engines or Web Spiders...
- Continually scans the internet, grabbing as much data as possible, such as TLS certificates and Domain Names
- Integral in current attack surface research [1,2]
- Their difference in scanning methods could result in discrepancies

Shodan

Country	America
Background	Product
Pricing	Subscription
Cost	\$69 - \$1099
Approach	Proprietary

Censys

Country	America
Background	Research
Pricing	Credits
Cost	\$100 - \$7200
Approach	ZMap

ZoomEye

Country	Hong Kong
Background	Product
Pricing	Credits
Cost	\$19 - \$1099
Approach	???

[1] T. Ashley, S. N. G. Gouriseti, N. Brown, and C. Bonebrake, Dec. 2022, doi: [10.1016/j.cose.2022.102939](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2022.102939).


[2] C. Harry, I. Sivan-Sevilla, and M. McDermott, doi: [10.1093/cybsec/tyae032](https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/tyae032).

Measuring The Discrepancy


- How significant are these discrepancies?
- Generated an attack surface using each platform
- To account for externally hosted assets, we can use TLS certificates and Domain Names
- Four organisations from the EU500 used in previous research [1]




No Platform Agrees




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
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
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
No Platform Agrees



Each Platform Has Unique Discoveries



No Platform Is Superior



Key Findings

- Depending on the platform, you will get different attack surfaces
- Platform disagree on which organisation has the biggest surface
- Using only RIRs is insufficient to create modern attack surfaces
- Omitting a single platform leads to an incomplete attack surface
- Are the results actual valid, or are they filled with bloat
- No indication of which is best, Censys discovers more ports but disagrees on attack surface size

Conclusion

- How can you know which, or how many, platforms to use?
- Multiple can be costly, especially for large-scale surfaces
- Reliance on a single platform leads to customers being misinformed about the true risk faced
- These attack surfaces are used to find vulnerabilities
- What is the ground truth? How can we be confident in the results from the platforms?
- This is what my PhD will focus on!
- If you would like to know more, there is a SIGCOMM poster

Questions?