

Consumer IoT Devices: Privacy Implications and Mitigation

Anna Maria Mandalari

Imperial College London

1


Based on joint works with: H. Haddadi, Roman Kolcun, D. Dubois, D. Choffnes



Why were we interested in this?

They may listen to you (e.g., smart speakers)





- They can (by definition) access the Internet and therefore may expose private information
- Lack of understanding on what information they expose, on when they expose it, and to whom

y may know what atch (e.g., smart TVs)




rt TV Snooping Features

looping Features


differences (e.g., GDPR) Smart i vs collect data about what you watch with a technology called ACR. Here's how to turn it off.

123 devices in two different countries






Blocking without Breaking





Idea

- What we learn: some IoT traffic is essential and some of it is non-essential
- Can we (partially) "silence" IoT devices and still be able to enjoy them?



Goals

- Measurement Methodology: How to automatically separate essential traffic from non-essential traffic?
- Identification: How prevalent is non-essential traffic in our testbed of 31 IoT devices?
- Generalizations: Are there any common patterns in non-essential traffic?
- Mitigation:

How to build a system for filtering non-essential traffic?

Challenges

- IoT devices are hard to test automatically
 - They offer very different functionalities
 - They suffer (in our experience) from frequent service outages that must be detected
 - They typically require user interaction (i.e., they are not directly programmable)
 - Hard to verify if a functionality was actually executed or not
- Ideas:
 - use companion devices (phones and voice assistants)
 - use **network traffic patterns** to classify IoT devices responses

Measurement Methodology

Hardware and Software of our IoT testbed


- IoT devices
 - 31 in total: 6 cameras, 15 home automation, 5 smart hubs, 3 smart speakers, 2 video
- Router with IP filtering and DNS filtering capabilities
- **Power plugs** and scripts to power cycle the devices
- **Trigger scripts** to invoke IoT devices functionality
 - Companion app interaction and voice assistant interaction
- **Probe scripts** to detect success or failure in functionality execution
 - Compare companion app *screenshots* and identification of *traffic peaks*

Design of Experiments

Goal: determine if a functionality works


- Test the functionality at least **10 times**
- Terminate if 80% consensus is reached
- When tested 30 times against ground truth, probes have been 80% correct
- If probes are 80% correct, the chance of an incorrect functionality experiment result is less than 0.01%

Activity	Description				
Power	power on/off the device				
Voice	voice commands for speakers				
Video	record/watch video				
On/Off	turn on/off bulbs/plugs				



Identifying Non-essential Traffic


Distinguishing Required from Non-Required Destinations



- If the functionality succeeds when a destination is blocked, such destination is **non-required**
- Otherwise it is required


Overall Results

Devices with at least one non-required destination




- 16/31 devices have non-essential traffic
- Mostly cameras, smart speakers, and video
- Possible explanations:
 - complexity (skills and apps)
 - uncommon vendors / rebranding (for cameras)

Impact of Destination Party



- Third parties are always non-required
 - Probably because of background app activity (Netflix)
- Some first/support parties also nonrequired
 - Best guess: firmware upgrade
 - Worst guess: data collection

Amount of Data Sent During One Experiment



- **Good news**: non-essential traffic is relatively small (less than 1KB/device)
- However, it is still possible to transmit:
 - Presence of the device
 - Its status
 - Basic data from the sensors (e.g., open/close, motion/still, alarm/no alarm)

Similarities with Existing Blocklists

- We consider Pi-hole, Firebog, MoAB, StopAD lists
- No required destinations on such lists
- Up to 6 out of 62 non-required destinations present in existing blocklists

 Public blocklists are of limited help in blocking IoT non-essential traffic

Device	Non-req Dest.	Pi-hole	Firebog	MoAB	StopAd
Allure Speaker	2	0	0	0	0
Bosiwo Camera	2	0	0	0	0
Echo Dot	7	1	1	0	0
Fire TV	11	2	3	1	0
Google Home	5	0	0	0	0
Icsee Doorbell	4	0	0	0	0
Nest Thermostat	1	0	0	0	0
Philips Hub	2	0	0	0	0
Reolink Camera	1	0	0	0	0
Roku TV	8	1	2	1	0
Samsung Hub	1	0	0	0	0
TP-Link Bulb	3	0	0	0	0
TP-Link Plug	3	0	0	0	0
Wansview Camera	6	0	0	0	0
Xiaomi Ricecooker	4	0	0	0	0
YI Camera	2	0	0	0	0

Number of non-required destinations present in public blocklists

Open Challenges

Testing more devices

Do protocol and ports help in detecting non-essential traffic?

Do required and non-required destinations change over time?

Mitigating Non-essential IoT Traffic

- A blocking system: **IoTrimmer**
 - Filtering router between the IoT devices and the Internet
 - Block/allow lists based on (non-)required destinations → crowdsourced
 - Software to declare device types and manage the lists / blocking rules
 - A proof-of-concept prototype is available for download

IoTrimmer Control Panel

Home	Settings Ab	out	Advanced	
Device List	Device Settings	×		
Blocking Icon	Enable Moniotr for my-smartthings-hub-	1		Config
• <	Change Device Icon		o., Ltd.	0
	Upload		c.	0
	Change Device Name		echnologies	0
• ?	Select Device Type			0
	Enable default blocking for new destinat	ions	1000	
raffic by locatio	Blocked Domains (click to allow)			
	Add new domains (comma separated)			
	Observed Domains (click to block)			
55	× dc.connect.smartthings.com × dc-eu01-euwest1.connect.smartthing × api.smartthings.com	is.com	rtthings-hub-: gle-home-1	L
	Save Changes		odot-1	

