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Adaptive Clustering-based Malicious Traffic Classification at the Network Edge

Alec F. Diallo, Dr. Paul Patras

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Network Intrusion Detection Systems

- Two main approaches: *Knowledge oriented / Data oriented*
- Shortcomings of existing solutions:


Severe

Low

Threat Level

- ★ Volume of false alarms too high for practical usage
- Performance degradation with increasing number of attack types
- Unable to distinguish similar but different attacks (U2R vs R2L, types of DDoS, ...)
- Trade-off between speed and accuracy
- Threat models: Attacker inside/outside the LAN


3 Proposed Solution



ACID Architecture: <u>Adaptive</u> <u>Clustering-based</u> <u>Intrusion</u> <u>Detection</u>

Solution | Adaptive Clustering network (AC-Net)


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


5 Solution | Adaptive Clustering network (AC-Net)

ingut Layer	Classical Neural Networks	S Adaptive Clustering Networks Networks
Scalability	Difficult	Easy
Parallelization	Data	Data + Sub-nets
Model Complexity	High (1 network = all tasks)	Low (1 sub-net = 1 task)
Architecture	Fixed (high risk of network saturation, conflicts in learned parameters)	Flexible (no network saturation, no conflict in learned parameters)
Sensitivity	Extreme (input features, unbalanced datasets,)	Marginal
Advantages	None	 Optimal class separation Intrinsic support for continual learning Built-in clustering mechanism

6 Results | Clustering with AC-Net





8 Results | Intrusion Detection

FAR: False Alarm Rate

Binary classification (Benchmark: ISCX-IDS 2012)

Classifier: Random Forests

- - Encoding dimension: 10
 - Payload features: 50

Approach	Payload-based Features	Accuracy (%)	FAR (%)	F ₁ Score (%)
DAGMM	No	62.91	30.65	53.07
N-BaloT	No	89.19	10.80	89.19
Deep NN	No	88.14	7.41	70.35
TR-IDS	Yes	98.88	1.12	98.87
ACID (ours)	No	99.78	0.23	99.44
ACID (ours)	Yes	100.0	0.00	100.0

Comparison of ACID with existing methods

9 Results | Intrusion Detection

Multi-label classification (ACID)


Metric	Accuracy	FAR	\mathbf{F}_1	Classes	Samples
Dataset	(%)	(%)	(%)		
KDD CUP'99	100.0	0.00	100.0	23	43,510
ISCX-IDS 2012	100.0	0.00	100.0	5	10,547
CSE-CIC-IDS 2018	100.0	0.00	100.0	15	144,772

Properties

Datasets:

- Time span: 20 years
- Number of attack types: 40
- Raw network traffic traces
- Train/Test split: 70/30
- Payload features: Yes
- Test set ≅ 0.2 Billion packets

- Classifier: Random Forests
- Encoding dimension: 10
- Payload features: 50




Normalized confusion matrix for multi-label classification using ACID on the ISCX-IDS 2012 dataset.

10 Impact factors | ISCX-IDS 2012

Feature ranking:


15 most important features in the classification process



- Classifier: Random Forests
- Encoding dimension: 10
- Payload features: 50

t-SNE (from AC-Net's Embeddings)

t-SNE: A tool used to simplify the visual exploration of high-dimensional data points



11 Complexity Analysis

Environmental setup

- 1 Virtual Machine
- 4 CPU cores @ 1.1GHz
- 4 GB RAM
- 50 GB Storage

\square	Speed	Analysis (pa	<u>ackets)</u>		
Paylo	ad features?	Duration	Throughpu	ut	
	No	0.78 us	1.3M pps	 6	
Υ	és	145 us	7K pps		
	Doploya	hlaan			
Payload	<u>Deploya</u> <u>constrai</u>	<u>ned dev</u> Batch	<u>Vices</u> Model Complexity	> 100x sp Execution Time	eed up
Payload	<u>constrai</u>	ned dev Batch size	Model Complexity (MFLOP)	Execution Time (seconds)	eed up
Payload	<u>CONSTRAI</u>	<u>ned dev</u> Batch	Model Complexity	Execution Time	eed up
Payload Features	<u>CONSTRAI</u> Number of Parameters	ned dev Batch size	Model Complexity (MFLOP) 1.49	Execution Time (seconds) 0.08 ± 0.01	eed up

Questions ?

Read more ?

Alec F. Diallo, Paul Patras. "Adaptive Clusteringbased Malicious Traffic Classification at the Network Edge" - IEEE INFOCOM 2021.

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Source code available at: github.com/Mobile-Intelligence-Lab/ACID

Contact: alec.frenn@ed.ac.uk